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PRICE-SETTING AND ATTAINMENT OF EQUILIBRIUM: POSTED
OFFERS VERSUS AN ADMINISTERED PRICE
Sean M. Collins, Duncan James, Maros Servatka and Daniel
Woods
The operation of the posted oer market with advance production environ-
ment (Mestelman and Welland, 1988), appropriately parameterized, diers from
that of the market entry game (Selten and Guth, 1982), appropriately presented,
only in terms of price-setting. We establish the eect of this dierence in price-
setting on attainment of the competitive equilibrium allocation while controlling
for eects relating to the presentation of the market entry game and to the
stationarity or non-stationarity of environment. Free posting of prices promotes
convergence to the competitive equilibrium allocation, while the typical market
entry game data can be characterized as displaying cycling prices.
How do markets equilibrate? What is responsible when they do not? We
generate insight on these questions by setting up a comparison of the mar-
ket entry game (Selten and Guth, 1982) and a posted oer with advance
production environment (Mestelman and Welland, 1988), hereafter denoted
as the POAP. We demonstrate that the POAP can be thought of as a non-
isomorphic relaxation of the market entry game, where the market entry
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game appears conversely as a market with advance production environ-
ment restricted to have an administered pricing rule|specically a uniform
price that allows ex post market clearing|instead of freely and individu-
ally posted oers. This insight then allows the construction of experiments
which isolate the marginal eects of dierent design features, by means of a
sequence of incrementally varying designs. Empirically, we nd dierent out-
of-equilibrium dynamics associated with the administered ex post market
clearing price rule versus posted oers, and more evidence of convergence to
the competitive equilibrium outcome given use of posted oers. Stationarity
of environment also aids equilibration.
The above results are demonstrated by data from our study. We generate
these data by implementing a sequence of treatments, beginning with the
market entry game in its original format. In our experiments, as in the prior
empirical literature, the market entry game generates volatile outcomes that
are generally inconsistent with complete adoption of pure strategy play, al-
though perhaps tempting to describe as \equilibrium plus noise". From
there we alter the exogenous control variable from \capacity" (i.e. a pa-
rameter of the demand schedule) to marginal cost. We then build on that
by altering the presentation of the game (in previous literature, presented
as an algebraic payo function) to make explicit the (previously implicit)
numerical demand schedule and the accompanying administered price rule,
i.e. ex post market clearing, both inherent in the market entry game. Each
of the experimental treatments listed so far introduces a single change in
design only, isolating the marginal eect of each change. Each change in
format and/or control variable as just described also preserves isomorphism
with the original implementation of the market game.
However, we then break with isomorphism by introducing a further treat-
ment, which introduces a second stage in which each subject nominates
his or her own price subsequent to entry. Individual posting of prices thus
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replaces the uniform ex post market clearing price rule embedded in the
immediately prior transformation of the market entry game; our sequence
of treatments thus terminates at a particular version of the POAP.
While the market entry game and the POAP are not isomorphic, it is
however the case that given pricing \via the demand curve"1 in the second
stage of the POAP (when prices are posted) the payo function in the rst
(advance production) stage of the POAP is exactly equivalent to the pay-
o function in the market entry game. In consequence there are subgame
perfect pure strategy equilibria in the POAP that have the same observ-
able outcomes, in quantities and prices, as the pure strategy equilibria in
the market entry game, in number of entrants and prices implicit to its ad-
ministered price rule. (In Appendix A, we demonstrate the preceding and
also delineate additional equilibria in the POAP which are not possible in
the market entry game; those additional equilibria are not exhibited by our
data.)
Does restricting the pricing possibilities, thereby reducing the number of
pure strategy equilibria relative to the POAP, allow the market entry game
to more quickly attain the competitive equilibrium allocation common to
both? Quite the opposite: we nd that the POAP converges more rapidly
to the competitive equilibrium allocation than does the market entry game.
Additionally, outcomes in the market entry game appear not to be evidence
of mixed strategy use by the subjects, but rather an out-of-equilibrium
phenomenon, en route to an equilibrium in pure strategies (consistent on
this point with results from Duy and Hopkins, 2005). We are also able to
advance understanding of the market entry game by identifying something
1Pricing \via the demand curve" means that each seller nominates a price that is equal
to the price coordinate of the point on the demand curve where the quantity coordinate
is given by the units produced (i.e., number of sellers who have decided to produce one
unit) in that round.
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that it would seem is going on instead of mixing: cycling.
1. THE GAME, THE MARKET, AND THEIR PREDICTIONS
Introduced by Selten and Guth (1982), the market entry game is an n-
player simultaneous game where players decide between two strategies: enter
the market (IN) or stay out (OUT). Empirically, the game has been studied
with linear payos. We consider a specication that nests earlier work, where
player i's payo is
(1) i =
8<:v; if player i chooses OUT;v + r(c m)  h; if player i chooses IN:
In this specication, m is the number of entrants, the parameters v, r,
and c, are positive integers, and h is a non-negative integer that satises
0 < h  r(c 1). Following the literature, v may be interpreted as an outside
option or entry subsidy, c as the capacity of the market to support entrants,
and r as a parameter determining the scale of the surplus captured from
entry, i.e. r(c m). The parameter h may be interpreted as a cost incurred
to enter the market.
Alternatively, one might present the payos in Equation 1 as the conse-
quence of entry or not when demand is P (m) = r(c  m) with an ex post
market clearing price, P , enforced based on a realized m; entry or not each
attract the same subsidy, v; and marginal cost of production is h.
For our discussion of Nash equilibria, we dene c^  c   h=r. One might
think of c^ as market capacity adjusted for the presence of an entry cost. If
h = 0, then clearly c^ = c.
There are many Nash equilibria for the market entry game (Gary-Bobo,
1990). There is a continuum of equilibria for which c^   1 players enter,
n  c^ stay out, and one player enters with any probability. A pure strategy
equilibrium occurs on either end of this continuum, where the proles of
pure strategies are consistent with either m = c^ or m = c^   1 players
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choosing to enter (and n   c^ or n   c^ + 1 players choosing to stay out,
respectively).2
For c^ > 1, there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for which
player i enters with probability
(2) p(c^) =
c^  1
n  1 for i = f1; : : : ; ng:
Additionally, there are asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria in which j <
c^  1 players enter with certainty, k < n  c^ players stay out with certainty,
and the remaining n  j   k players enter with probability (c^  1  j)=(n 
1  j   k).
The predicted number of entrants follow from the preceding equilibria.
Common to all Nash equilibria for the market entry game is that the ex-
pected number of entrants is between c^ and c^   1, inclusive. The expected
number of entrants under pure strategy equilibria occupy each extreme. In
the asymmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the expected number of en-
trants is n(c^ 1)=(n 1). In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the
expected number of entrants is j + (c^  1  j)(n  j   k)=(n  1  j   k).
We can convert the market entry game just described into a market with
entry: specically, the POAP.3 We thus present a market wherein agents
must pre-commit to production, but are allowed to nominate their own
prices. After making a binary choice | which could be labelled either as
2For ease of exposition, we denote only the number of entrants consistent with the
competitive equilibrium allocation as m.
3Mestelman andWelland (1988) present experiments using a dierently structured and
parameterized posted oer with advance production environment. Among the dierences
between that study and this one, in Mestelman and Welland: sellers do not know the
demand curve; prices are chosen simultaneously to production/entry; and buyers are
queued randomly, instead of by value order. Additional dierences are delineated in
footnote 21. Johnson and Plott (1989) present another, also dierently parameterized,
version of a posted oer with advance production.
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having entered or not, or equivalently, as having incurred the cost of pro-
ducing one unit or not | each agent is informed of the total number of units
for sale and then posts an asking price for his or her unit. The buyer queue
consists of robots buying in value order (Levitan and Shubik, 1972). The
highest step on the demand curve gets to buy rst, buying if resale value is
greater than or equal to the lowest asking price, otherwise not at all, and so
on down the demand schedule, with ties between units listed at the same
asking price broken randomly. The POAP is thus a two-stage game, with
a rst stage of advance production (with an equivalent space to the entry
choice in the market entry game), then a pricing stage. (Note also that the
entry/production subsidy and outside option, each equal to v, are still in
eect in our implementation of POAP.)
We show in Appendix A that some of the pure strategy equilibria in the
POAP feature agents who expect, as of the rst stage, that pricing in the
second stage will be \via the demand schedule". In such cases the setting
for the binary rst stage choices in the POAP is identical to the market
entry game. The pure strategy equilibria for the market entry game will
then have payo equivalent pure strategy equilibria in the implementation
of the POAP that we study. In Appendix A, it is demonstrated that c^  1
agents producing, then pricing at r(c  1 m), or c^ agents producing then
pricing at r(c m) are each pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
These equilibria yield the same respective payos as the c^ and c^  1 entrant
pure strategy equilibria in the market entry game. 4
How, then, do the outcomes of the POAP compare to the market entry
game in actual, real time, play? Does administering the uniform ex post
market clearing price or allowing individual posting of prices best facilitate
4Additional \collusive pricing" (as opposed to collusive entry/quantity) equilibria exist
in the POAP, though obviously not in the market entry game. These equilibria are as
characterized in Appendix A, but do not emerge in the data presented in subsection 4.4.
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trade? What clues do dierences in price (implicit or explicit) and quantity
dynamics yield as to cause(s) of any such dierences? As the reader will
see, our results in section 4 start by rst following then recasting the classic
work recounted in section 2. From there, observation of dynamics across
games ultimately allows a deepened understanding of equilibration and of
the role of prices therein.
2. PRIOR EMPIRICAL WORK
Empirical testing of the market entry game took place soon after it was
described: Kahneman (1988), Sundali et al. (1995), Rapoport (1995), and
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) being four key early contributions. Erev and
Rapoport (1998, pg. 150) characterize foundational empirical work on the
market entry game as follows.
The major ndings of the previous studies can be briey summarized. Positive
and highly signicant correlations between the 10 pairs of c andm values were
found on each block.5 For groups of n = 20 subjects, the correlations were
around 0.90. When several dierent groups were combined (n = 60), the
correlations increased to about 0.98. Rapid convergence to the equilibrium
was already achieved on the rst block.
Erev and Rapoport also point out individual-level evidence at odds with
interpreting the data as having converged to equilibrium on page 150 and
in more detail on page 151 (quoted below).
Although the values of m rapidly converged to c or c   1 on the aggregate
level (when v = 1), no support was found for either the pure-strategy or
symmetrical mixed-strategy equilibria on the individual level. In violation of
the pure-strategy equilibrium prediction that implies static decision policies,
large within-subjects variability was observed. And in violation of the sym-
5Erev and Rapoport refer to \blocks" of 10 periods with 10 random orderings of c,
and the implied m, in each block, resulting in 10 observations of m entrants in each
block.
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metrical mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction, the between-subjects stan-
dard deviations of number of entries for every value of c were always larger
than (p(c)(1  p(c))n)1=2, the value predicted at this equilibrium.
Is a high correlation between two variables, or a high R2 in univariate
regression of pooled time series data, sucient evidence that equilibrium
has been attained? As will be detailed later, the results of our study suggest
that it is not. Rather the reservations expressed by Erev and Rapoport
and others appear to be well-founded. Our experimental design (detailed in
section 3 of this paper) implements a multi-block sequence (as in Sundali
et al., 1995, and subsequent studies) of alternating sub-blocks of periods
with varying c^ (as in Sundali et al.) and sub-blocks of stationary c^ (instead
like Erev and Rapoport). This allows us to carry out a variety of analyses,
as implemented in these earlier papers, as a calibration exercise.6
The other literature with which our experiments connect is the work on
the posted oer with advance production (Mestelman and Welland, 1988;
Johnson and Plott, 1989). In terms of institution, the POAP is a standard
posted oer laboratory market; however, its environment is one in which
sellers must incur unrecoverable production costs prior to transacting. The
environment most commonly used in laboratory markets, production-to-
order, instead allows ex post production, which typically would only com-
prise units protable to the seller. The advance production environment is
generally held to be a dicult setting for equilibration. Indeed prices con-
verge more slowly, and eciencies (i.e. realized gains from trade) are lower in
the advance production environment (Mestelman and Welland, 1988) than
6Prior studies nd that more information about play in prior rounds aids convergence
toward some equilibrium. Duy and Hopkins (2005) in particular nd that their Full
Information treatment (where subjects are presented with every payo of every individual
subject in every round) allows attainment of pure strategy equilibrium in some sessions
towards the end of a 100 period experiment. We do not provide information from prior
rounds, and hence do not vary provision of such information as a treatment.
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in a production to order environment.
Does the advance production environment embedded in the market entry
game preclude equilibration, or is a change in approach to pricing, holding
constant the use of advance production, sucient to allow the competitive
equilibrium to be obtained? As we will show later, the connection between
the market entry game and the POAP proves to be useful in understanding
the role of price-setting in equilibration of markets.
3. DESIGN
Throughout all experiments, we set v = 1, r = 2, and have n = 5 subjects
in each group. In a given treatment, either h is held constant throughout
the treatment while c could vary, or vice versa. Regardless of whether h
varies or c varies, h and c are chosen such that the cost-of-entry-adjusted
capacity of the market, c^, is the same across treatments in each period.7
We implement six treatments in total: four versions of the market entry
game, and two versions of POAP. The four versions of the market entry
game are isomorphic to each other, and implemented as follows.
• Meg:Og-g implements the market entry game in its original form.
Subjects choose \IN" or \OUT" by means of radio buttons. The payo
for \OUT" is always 1; the payo for \IN" is equal to 1+2(c m) h,
where c is capacity, varied here as the exogenous control parameter
and taking the values f1; 2; 3; 4g,m is the sum of the \IN" choices, and
h is the cost of entry. Cost, h, is held constant at zero for all subjects
(but as mentioned earlier, subjects knew only their own h). We have
denoted this treatment Meg:Og-g for original game (OG) with a
group-level (G) shifter, since payos are expressed algebraically and
7For example, in period 5, c = 3 and h = 0 in one treatment (Meg:Og-g) and
c = 5 and h = 4 in another (Meg:Og-i). In either case, c^ = c   h=r equals 3, and the
equilibrium predictions are identical.
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the commonly known parameter c is varied, as in previous literature.
• Meg:Og-i is the same as Meg:Og-g, except the exogenous control
variable is cost instead of capacity. The details remain the same, ex-
cept that capacity, c, is held constant at 5, and the cost of entry,
h, is varied as the exogenous control parameter, taking the values
f2; 4; 6; 8g. We denote this treatment as Meg:Og-i because h is var-
ied rather than c; h is individual (I), and private, information.8
• Meg:Mf-i is the same as Meg:Og-i, except subjects are presented
with a numerical demand schedule and an ex post market clearing
price rule replacing the algebraic payo function in Meg:Og-i (and
also Meg:Og-g) in a payo-preserving manner. As before, subjects
choose \IN" or \OUT" by means of radio buttons. The payo for
\OUT" is always 1. The payo for \IN" is equal to 1+P (m) h, where
h is the cost of entry, varied here as the exogenous control parameter
and taking the values f2; 4; 6; 8g. The price, P (m), is equal to the
resale value coordinate of the demand schedule associated with the
number of entrants,m, that period. This demand schedule is presented
in Table I. (Note that r = 2 is the step between adjacent resale values.)
We denote this treatmentMeg:Mf-i because information is presented
to subjects in a market format (MF), and h is varied with c constant.
• Meg:Mf-g is the same as Meg:Mf-i, except cost of entry does not
vary from period to period; rather, the location of the demand curve
does. This necessitates a family of demand schedules derived by shift-
8The fourMeg:Og-i groups are split into two sets of two groups each. One set received
an additional line of instruction on the interpretation of c^ as an intersection; one did not.
This is done as a procedural check, and ex post statistical checks did not reveal any dif-
ference between the two approaches. Instructions are included in sections subsection B.2
and subsection B.3 of the appendix. Groups that received the intersection instructions
are denoted Meg:Og-i, or have session numbers followed by an asterisk (*) in reported
Meg:Og-i data.
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TABLE I
Demand Schedule in Meg:Mf-i and Poap-i
Unit Number 0 1 2 3 4 5
Resale Value 10 8 6 4 2 0
ing the demand schedule shown in Table I, while holding h constant.
These shifts are used to create payo possibilities in Meg:Mf-g iso-
morphic to those in Meg:Mf-i, period-by-period.9 We denote this
treatment Meg:Mf-g because a market format is used and there are
group-level shifts in demand.
The two dimensions along which the original market entry game is trans-
formed are thus: (1) whether individual subject marginal cost or a group-
level shifter is the exogenous control variable subject to experimenter vari-
ation from period to period and (2) whether the surplus captured from
entry, r(c m) in the original game, is presented by means of an algebraic
payo function or by a numerical step demand function and associated ad-
ministered price rule. Variation in these two dimensions allows us to assess
whether results in the market entry game are or are not dependent on the
source of payo-relevant information (individual or group-level shifter) or
the format of that information (algebraic payo function or verbal descrip-
tion in an economic context). Table II summarizes which of these treatments
implements which combination of attributes.
Varying format of information (e.g. between market or game) can impact
decision-making (Cox and James, 2012). Any impact on decision-making of
whether payo-relevant changes in parametrization are communicated by
9In Meg:Mf-g, the demand schedule specied in Meg:Mf-i (Table I) is shifted,
with resale values being f8; 6; 4; 2; 0g, f10; 8; 6; 4; 2g, f12; 10; 8; 6; 4g, or f14; 12; 10; 8; 6g
for units 1 through 5. The cost of entry, h, is held constant at 8. We increased h and
simultaneously shifted the curves \up", relative to Meg:Mf-i, in order to avoid the use
of negative resale values.
workingpaper.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: paper.tex date: September 19, 2017
12
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
TABLE II
Matrix of Isomorphic Market Entry Game Treatments
Group-level shifter Individual-level shifter
(capacity, c, or location (cost of entry, h)
of demand curve)
Algebraic payo function Meg:Og-g Meg:Og-i
Numerical step demand, and
Meg:Mf-g Meg:Mf-i
associated pricing rule
either (equivalent) private-and-individual parameter shifts or public-and-
global parameter shifts is an empirical question; a dierence is a possibility
and thus we make provision for its capture, if it exists.10
Breaking with isomorphism by allowing subjects to post prices after they
have rst chosen whether or not to enter, and second, been informed of the
number of entrants in that period gives us the two Poap treatments. In
these treatments, posting from the set of permitted prices f0; 2; 4; 6; 8; 10g
is only possible if the player pre-commits and incurs a cost conditional on
that pre-commitment (i.e. engages in advance production).
Poap employs robot-buyers queueing in value order (Levitan and Shubik,
1972) on the demand side of the market; value-order queueing helps to
shape the theoretical predictions in Poap, as explained in section 1 and
detailed in Appendix A. Poap-g employs shifts in the demand schedule
in a manner equivalent to Meg:Mf-g, while Poap-i employs shifts in the
10Note also that market entry experiments typically introduced parameter shifts via
changes in capacity, c, a publicly observable and global variable, while many market ex-
periments including those by Mestelman and Welland (1988) have tended to introduce
information privately at the individual level. Thus, in order to create a chain of compa-
rable, adjacent experimental parameterizations connecting the market entry game in its
usual form and POAP, one needs to eect a transition from using a global variable as a
parameter shifter to using an individual variable as a parameter shifter. Our sequence of
treatments accomplishes this.
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cost of entry equivalent toMeg:Mf-i.11 Properly translated, a pure strategy
equilibrium in, say, period 37 in any of Meg:Og-g,Meg:Og-i,Meg:Mf-g
orMeg:Mf-i, has a counterpart with the same payos across players, given
subgame perfect play, in period 37 of Poap-g and Poap-i. (We provide an
example and summary of this in Table VIII of the appendix.)
In all treatments, we disclose the payo function or demand schedule and
accompanying pricing regime at the start of each period. The number of
entrants and the individual's own payo are disclosed as feedback at the
end of each period. (Note that in Poap the number of entrants is also dis-
closed prior to the pricing decision.) Each player's h is private information,
throughout all our experiments; h is also identical across all subjects in a
given experiment, but not knowing this, subjects can not assess one an-
other's payos. In treatments with explicit pricing, whether subject-posted
or administered, pricing is also displayed at the end of each period. In Poap,
instead of an across-the-board administered price, as in Meg:Mf, dierent
prices across players are possible. However, as players are anonymous (no
11The possibility of failure to transact, present in Poap, is not present in Meg:Og
or Meg:Mf. Consequently, Poap-g and Poap-i must necessarily dier from each other
in at least one of the following: (1) whether or not the loss incurred given failure to sell
is identical across otherwise isomorphic (to each other) Poap-g and Poap-i parameter-
izations and (2) whether or not salvage values for unsold units are employed in Poap-g.
If salvage values (of a very specic parameterization) are employed in Poap-g, identical
payos (including in the case of failure to sell) to those in Poap-i can be established;
however this comes at the cost of introducing salvage values which are not present (or
rather, are implicitly zero) in Poap-i. Conversely, if no dierence is introduced in the
form of salvage values for unsold units, then a dierence in magnitude of loss, given
failure to sell, must necessarily exist. We dealt with this by running half of the Poap-g
groups without salvage values and half with salvage values. Instructions may be found
in sections subsection B.6 and subsection B.7 of the appendix, respectively. Groups for
which no salvage values are used are denoted Poap-g, or have session numbers followed
by a double asterisk (**) in reported Poap-g data.
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identiers are displayed in any treatments) and h is always private infor-
mation, this conveys no additional payo information relative to Meg:Og
orMeg:Mf.12 Furthermore, note that there is less information available to
subjects in our experiments than in Duy and Hopkins' Aggregate Infor-
mation treatment, and also their Full Information treatment, a fortiori.13
There are 96 periods in each experimental session. Each session is divided
into 6 blocks of 16 periods. Within each block of 16, during the rst 4 periods
the exogenous control variable is varied randomly but without replacement
through a predicted number of entrants at pure strategy competitive equi-
librium, m, of 1; 2; 3; 4. In Meg:Og, this is done by varying c^ = m; in
Meg:Mf and Poap, either h or the demand schedule is varied to yield a
given m. (Recall in cross-section, i.e. across all treatments, m is the same
in a given period.) During the middle 8 \stationary" periods the exogenous
control variable does not change, and m = 3 remains constant throughout.
The nal four periods of each block return to varying m as during the
rst four periods but with a new randomized ordering. The orderings of
m are identical across all sessions. The nonstationary periods implement
the environment typical of key early experiments on market entry games,
such as those run by Sundali et al. (1995). In keeping m constant across
the periods in the middle of each block, we implement a feature common
in market experiments, including the POAP experiments of Mestelman and
Welland (1988), and one used throughout the market entry game experi-
ments of Duy and Hopkins (2005). The relatively large number of periods
is intended to create a chance of capturing long run behavior, as in Duy
12The demand schedule is known prior to all action in a period, in Poap as inMeg:Mf
(and implicitlyMeg:Og, too). Thus knowledge of transactions at particular prices cannot
convey any information about demand not already disclosed.
13Note also that across the four market entry game treatments (Meg:Og-g,Meg:Og-
i, Meg:Mf-g and Meg:Mf-i), which are isomorphic to each other, there is no variation
of economically relevant information whatsoever, only in the format of its presentation.
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and Hopkins (2005).
Subjects were given instructions (reproduced in Appendix B) individu-
ally and privately for self-paced reading and an additional announcement
was made publicly that all subjects had received the same instructions. All
questions were addressed individually and privately when subjects raised
their hands. Between each block of 16 periods a one minute break was fol-
lowed by two practice periods and an opportunity to review the instructions
if the subjects wished (just as at the start of the experiment).
All subject groups are disjoint, and no subject participated in more than a
single session. Each group consists of 5 subjects and is xed throughout that
session; there are two concurrent, unrelated groups per session. All experi-
ments took less than two and a half hours. Payos consisted of one period
randomly selected after the experiment from each of the six blocks, plus a
show-up fee.14 Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from
the subject pool maintained by the New Zealand Experimental Economics
14This payo procedure is chosen for two reasons. First, we need to avoid incentive
problems caused by attained or impending bankruptcy on the part of the subjects. This
problem occurs when the subjects can lose money in a single period, and earnings ac-
cumulate across periods. The payo procedures used by Sundali et al. (1995), and that
used by Mestelman and Welland (1988), are each not compatible with the rest of our
design. Sundali et al. pay for all periods, and avoid the issue of subjects strategizing
about trading at or near bankruptcy by withholding feedback; this approach is incom-
patible with our design. Mestelman and Welland pay for all periods, and give feedback,
but also then endow their subjects with working capital, the depletion of which could still
(endogenously) change the incentives of the game. With these approaches ruled out, we
are left with a choice between paying for a single period (over the entire experiment), or
the payo procedure used by Duy and Hopkins (2005), who paid one period (randomly
selected) from each of their four blocks. In order not to introduce an avoidable dierence
between our design and that of Duy and Hopkins, we paid one period (randomly se-
lected) from each of our blocks. We have six blocks, instead of four, but otherwise follow
their approach.
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Laboratory at the University of Canterbury. Experiments were computer-
ized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4. RESULTS
4.1. Overview of Results
Allowing individual posting of prices leads to much more rapid conver-
gence than does a uniform ex post market clearing price. That convergence
is to a familiar equilibrium in pure strategies: the competitive market equi-
librium. Figure 1 and Figure 2 together encapsulate all group-level (en-
try/quantity) data for all experiments. (Individual-level price data from
Poap are analyzed separately in subsection 4.4).
Notable results from the data are summarized as follows.
• Unlike in Meg:Og-g, in the other treatments data consistent with a
pure strategy equilibrium is observed for the entirety of some 8-period
segments of the stationary environment.
• Recall the pure strategy equilibrium in the market entry game charac-
terized by the same players forming the same split between c^ entrants
and n  c^ non-entrants; one could argue that this equilibrium has been
\attained" if the preceding characterization holds over all periods in
a segment. This condition is indeed fullled: thirteen times in Poap,
ve times inMeg:Mf, and twice inMeg:Og (both inMeg:Og-i).15
• If the additional standards are imposed on Poap that: (a) all entrants
must also successfully transact, and (b) said transactions must take
place at the price associated with a single equilibrium, then attain-
ment of pure strategy equilibrium drops to eight instances. Even under
the more stringent standard, competitive pure strategy equilibrium is
15The \collusive" pure strategy equilibrium consisting of c^  1 entrants and n  c^  1
non-entrants is never observed over the entire length of an eight-period segment, in any
treatment.
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Figure 1: Entry Across Treatments with Group-Level Shifters
The observed number of entrants is listed below the box for each period. The predicted
number of entrants, m is listed at top. Sessions with  are explained in footnote 11.
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Figure 2: Entry Across Treatments with Individual-Level Shifters
The observed number of entrants is listed below the box for each period. The predicted
number of entrants, m is listed at top. Sessions with the  are explained in footnote 8.
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attained most often, and earliest, in Poap.
Focusing on the subjects' ability to nominate prices in Poap, we see
that this feature, despite adding dimensionality to the subjects' respective
action sets, is associated with the most rapid convergence to pure strategy
equilibrium. That is, despite introducing an extra choice variable with six
possible settings (each contingent on the number of entrants), and requiring
equilibration across more dimensions, Poap equilibrates fastest as well as
most frequently.
As we investigate the data in more detail, we will trace through the suc-
cessive transformations of the market entry game, starting with an analysis
of how our results fromMeg:Og-g replicate the key ndings on the market
entry game in its original form.
4.2. Establishing a baseline | and comparison with results from Sundali,
Rapoport, and Seale (1995)
The nonstationary periods ofMeg:Og-g generate results which are broadly
consistent with Experiment 2 of Sundali et al. (1995).16 Table III presents
and summarizes our data in a similar manner to that in Table 4 of Sundali
et al.'s study, reporting entry broken down by blocks of the experiment and
summary statistics, including correlations between m and c.
Like Sundali et al., we nd \high" correlations betweenm and c, although
in our data they are slightly lower (being closer to .80 than .90). One might
attribute this dierence to greater discreteness in our design.17
16We consider Sundali et al.'s Experiment 2, rather than Experiment 1, because it
more closely matches our design in that subjects receive periodic feedback and that
there are more (varying) blocks.
17The lower correlations in our data may reect the fact we have only 5, rather than
20, possible entrants per group, and that we use only 4, rather than 10, exogenous
manipulations of c. The number of entrants, m, \missing" c by one entrant in our study
represents 20% of the possible variation in m, as opposed to the 5% of possible variation
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TABLE III
Average Number of Entries by Block and Market Capacity Across
Groups in Treatment Meg:Og-g
Observed Symmetric MSE
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Mean SD Mean SD
Varying c
c = 1 1.25 1.12 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.62 0.83 0.69 { {
c = 2 0.88 2.25 1.62 1.75 2.00 1.88 1.73 0.79 1.25 0.97
c = 3 2.62 2.88 2.62 2.50 2.75 3.00 2.73 0.82 2.50 1.12
c = 4 3.75 3.88 3.50 3.25 3.62 3.50 3.58 0.96 3.75 0.97
Mean 2.12 2.53 2.12 2.06 2.22 2.25 2.22 1.32 1.88 1.65
Correlation 0.73 0.78 0.72 0.83 0.88 0.84 0.79 { { {
Constant c
c = 3 2.69 2.78 2.84 2.97 2.62 2.59 2.75 0.90 2.50 1.12
Note: \Symmetric MSE" refers to the prediction under the symmetric-mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
We also replicate another part of Sundali et al.'s analysis (their Table
6) in (our) Table IV. For each of the 4 values of c presented to subjects,
we tabulate a 2  2 matrix that summarizes the overlap (or lack thereof)
across the (\stay out" or \enter") decisions observed in a given period and
those observed in the most immediately prior identically parameterized pe-
riod.18 As in Sundali et al. (1995), the o-diagonal cells of these matrices
do not contain a count of zero, and are therefore inconsistent with complete
adoption of pure strategies.
We however do observe that the proportion of data in the o-diagonal
in Sundali et al.; this phenomenon will then impact the calculated correlations between
m and c, for the respective data sets.
18Sub-blocks with varying m are units of four periods over which c takes the values
f1; 2; 3; 4g in randomized order. Every other pair of sub-blocks (starting with the rst and
second, continuing through the third and fourth, and so on), is split by a sequence of 8
periods in which c remains constant (excluded in this analysis). The remaining sub-blocks
(starting with the second and third) are directly adjacent | one immediately follows the
other. In this way, for each of the 4 values of c presented to subjects, we tabulate a 2 2
matrix that summarizes the overlap (or not) across the \stay out" or \enter" decisions
observed in a given period and those observed in the most immediately prior identically
parameterized period.
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TABLE IV
Transition Matrices Between Adjacent Sub-blocks With Varying c
Across all Subjects in Treatment Meg:Og-g
Sub-Block 2
Out In
Sub-Block Out 31 19
1 In 11 19
IC=0.375
Sub-Block 3
Out In
Sub-Block Out 29 13
2 In 11 29
IC=0.300
Sub-Block 4
Out In
Sub-Block Out 31 9
3 In 8 32
IC0.213
Sub-Block 5
Out In
Sub-Block Out 29 10
4 In 15 26
IC=0.313
Sub-Block 6
Out In
Sub-Block Out 38 6
5 In 10 26
IC=0.200
Sub-Block 7
Out In
Sub-Block Out 40 8
6 In 6 26
IC=0.175
Sub-Block 8
Out In
Sub-Block Out 42 4
7 In 6 28
IC=0.125
Sub-Block 9
Out In
Sub-Block Out 43 5
8 In 3 29
IC=0.100
Sub-Block 10
Out In
Sub-Block Out 40 6
9 In 3 31
IC0.113
Sub-Block 11
Out In
Sub-Block Out 39 4
10 In 5 32
IC0.113
Sub-Block 12
Out In
Sub-Block Out 39 5
11 In 5 31
IC=0.125
Sub-Block j + 1
Out In
Sub-Block Out 401 89
j In 83 307
IC0.196
Note: Transition matrices summarize the overlap (or not) across decisions observed in a given pe-
riod and the most immediately prior identically parameterized period. Sub-blocks are dened in
footnote 18. IC is the index of change, or the proportion of observations in the o-diagonal cells.
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TABLE V
Number of Entries by Subject and Market Capacity in Treatment
Meg:Og-g
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Varying c
c = 1 1 0 1 0 4 1 11 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 2 0 2 8 0 2
c = 2 0 9 2 0 11 2 11 0 4 0 4 0 5 11 2 2 0 11 0 9
c = 3 3 3 12 0 9 11 2 0 6 12 10 7 8 8 4 7 4 12 1 12
c = 4 11 12 12 0 12 3 4 6 10 10 12 12 11 5 3 12 11 12 2 12
Total 15 24 27 0 36 17 28 6 20 22 28 20 25 28 11 21 17 43 3 35
Constant c
c = 3 22 25 41 0 47 45 6 2 28 48 32 38 27 27 10 16 22 48 3 41
cells (i.e. the index of change, denoted IC) tends to fall over the course
the experiment, as it does in Sundali et al.'s data.19 These data thus sug-
gest the possibility of some movement towards (though not attainment of)
equilibrium in pure strategies.
4.3. Evidence concerning whether or not mixing occurs in Meg:Og-g
We nd evidence against mixing similar to Sundali et al. (1995). Sun-
dali et al. (pg. 215) state that \the [symmetric] mixed-strategy equilibrium
implies a linear relationship for each subject between the value of c and
the corresponding number of entries summed over blocks. Inspection of the
individual results does not seem to support the prediction". In Table V, we
follow their analysis with our data. The data show that half of the subjects
display reductions in the frequency of entry in at least one of their changes
in c from 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 4. For only four subjects are there always
increases in the frequency of entry as c increases.
19We nd some statistical evidence against the hypothesis that the o-diagonals of
the transition matrices in Table IV are equal across sub-blocks. Across the four dierent
values of c, we conduct four McNemar's paired tests over changes in subjects switching
strategies; one test rejects that these are the same in the last pair of sub-blocks as in the
rst pair of sub-blocks; three tests fail to reject. We document these tests in the Table IX
of the appendix.
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4.4. The posted oer with advance production | and comparison with
results from Mestelman and Welland, 1988
We will now motivate the statistical analysis to come in subsection 4.6,
and aid comparison of the dynamics of the market entry game and POAP,
visually, by means of traditional price convergence graphs (for example,
Plott and Smith, 1978). In Figure 3 and Figure 4, we do this for stationary
periods of both of thePoap treatments (Poap-g andPoap-i, respectively).
Figures 3 and 4 present all information needed to evaluate the function-
ing of these institutions: asking prices, acceptances or refusals of asking
prices, and resultant eciency numbers. Asking prices are represented by
open circles; acceptance of an ask lls in an open circle, creating a black
dot; transacted quantity (a count of black dots within a period) is printed
above the horizontal axis; eciency is printed below the horizontal axis. The
column of space within which an ask can be recorded within each period
maps to a particular subject.20
The POAP markets we conduct appear ultimately to converge to equi-
librium, with 100% eciency attained in many periods later in the experi-
ment. The average eciencies over the entire experiments in our study are
around 80%, as excess entry and/or mispricing lead to large eciency losses
on occasion, particularly in early periods. For comparison Mestelman and
Welland (1988) nd an average eciency of 80% over all 18 periods, while
over the nal 8 periods of their 18 periods, average eciency is 89%.
Restricting attention to just the rst 18 stationary periods of Poap (the
same number of periods as Mestelman and Welland) we nd an average
20No ask is printed if no entry takes place, but even then such a blank column still
pertains to the particular subject associated with it (and who in that case did not enter
in that period). Thus the history of any individual's entry, asks, and outcomes may also
be tracked by looking for the column of space allotted that individual, and the overall
composition of entrants in a period can be likewise identied.
workingpaper.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: paper.tex date: September 19, 2017
24
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
S D
$4$6$8$1
0
$1
2
$1
4
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
Se
ss
io
n 
1
Tr
ad
in
g 
Pe
rio
d
Qu
an
tity
 E
xc
ha
ng
ed
 (E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 B
el
ow
)
*
*
0
1
2
3
4
5
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
S D
$4$6$8$1
0
$1
2
$1
4
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
1
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
−
0.
33
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
−
0.
33
−
0.
33
−
0.
67
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
−
0.
33
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
−
0.
33
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
Se
ss
io
n 
2
Tr
ad
in
g 
Pe
rio
d
Qu
an
tity
 E
xc
ha
ng
ed
 (E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 B
el
ow
)
*
*
0
1
2
3
4
5
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
S D
$4$6$8$1
0
$1
2
$1
4
3
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
0.
33
0.
67
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
−
0.
33
0.
33
0.
33
−
0.
33
1.
00
0.
33
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
0.
33
0.
33
−
0.
33
1.
00
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
Se
ss
io
n 
3
Tr
ad
in
g 
Pe
rio
d
Qu
an
tity
 E
xc
ha
ng
ed
 (E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 B
el
ow
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
S D
$4$6$8$1
0
$1
2
$1
4
2
2
2
3
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
0.
33
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
0.
33
1.
00
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
−
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
0.
33
0.
33
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
33
0.
33
0.
33
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
Se
ss
io
n 
4
Tr
ad
in
g 
Pe
rio
d
Qu
an
tity
 E
xc
ha
ng
ed
 (E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 B
el
ow
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l l
l
ll
l
ll
l l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Se
llin
g 
Pr
ic
e
As
ki
ng
 P
ric
e,
 
Un
so
ld
Figure 3: Asks, Prices, and Quantities Exchanged in Stationary Periods of
All Sessions of Treatment Poap-g.
Note: Sessions with asterisks () are explained in footnote 11.
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Figure 4: Asks, Prices, and Quantities Exchanged in Stationary Periods of
All Sessions of Treatment Poap-i.
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eciency of approximately 51%. For the last 8 of those periods (11 through
18), average eciency is 65%. In the nal 8 period stationary segment of
our Poap treatments (periods 85 to 92), average eciency is 89%. As with
comparisons to the market entry game, we should point out that our en-
vironment is more discrete than in those previously studied. (In this case,
Mestelman and Welland had more units per seller and overall, among other
dierences.)21
Mestelman and Welland report higher-than-equilibrium prices, and we
also observe prices converging largely from above during early periods of
Poap. Overall, we nd that despite parameterization dierences, Mestel-
man and Welland's results t well with ours|and also that over long hori-
zons it turns out that the POAP converges to the competitive equilibrium.
4.5. Price and quantities within and across periods: administered prices
versus individually posted oers
Juxtaposition of Meg:Og and Poap allows us to assess outcomes of the
market entry game in a new light|as out-of-equilibrium price dynamics. In
particular, when viewed in this way, volatile outcomes in the market entry
game might be characterized as cycling in prices.
One can plot the quantities and prices generated via the administered
21As mentioned in footnote 3, Mestelman and Welland (1988) implement the POAP
environment with dierent design parameters than those in the present study: markets
run for 18 periods (rather than 96 periods in the present study); sellers do not know the
market demand curve, and make production and posted price decisions simultaneously
without knowledge of market production prior to posting prices (rather than these being
known, with production preceding pricing); human buyers purchase in a randomized
order (rather than value-order robots); pricing varies down to the penny (rather than a
minimum price increment of $2.00); dierent and entirely stationary supply and demand
parameters (rather than only 48 of 96 periods being stationary); and no outside option
or entry subsidy (rather than there being one, i.e. v = 1).
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Figure 5: Implied Prices and Quantities Exchanged in Stationary Periods
of All Sessions of Treatment Meg:Og-g.
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price rule embedded in the original market entry game (Meg:Og-g) in the
same manner as one might visualize the Poap markets. We present such
results for Meg:Og-g in Figure 5.22
As will be further demonstrated in the statistical analysis to come in sub-
section 4.6, Poap converges to the competitive equilibrium. By the same
criteria, the original market entry game (Meg:Og-g) may not do so, except
over a much longer time horizon. Rather, over shorter time horizons, prices
in Meg:Og-g oscillate to either side of the competitive equilibrium price.
In between failing to converge to the competitive equilibrium in stationary
segments, Meg:Og-g generates metrics in non-stationary segments simi-
lar to the Sundali et al. (1995) market entry game when analyzed using
their methods. We thus suspect that a similar cycling dynamic is embedded
in typical market entry game data, and contributes to the characteristic
patterns therein.
In turn we believe that cycling is enabled by the pricing rule implicit
to the market entry game, which forces all strategy and adaptation on the
part of the subjects into a single dimension, quantity.23 Thus, price dis-
persion under the administered uniform ex post market clearing price can
22We present similar graphs for Meg:Og-i, Meg:Mf-g, and Meg:Mf-i in Figure 6,
Figure 7, and Figure 8 of the appendix.
23Relative to to Poap, the market entry game exhibits high eciencies. This results
from the forced clearing of all produced units (i.e. all entrants necessarily record a sale).
For example, excess entry such that there are 4 entrants in a period where c^ = 3 neces-
sarily maps to eciency of 67% in the market entry game, but could potentially result
in a negative eciency number in the POAP if some entrants post high enough prices
and unsold units result.
In eect, the market entry game forces a cross-subsidization of losses induced by
excess entry. While this may allow for higher eciencies in the market entry game than
the POAP before convergence, it also distorts the feedback that sellers in the market
entry game might otherwise receive about their entry decisions, and may thus slow the
attainment of convergence.
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only occur across periods. Consider the following comparison of variation of
prices in cross-section versus that in time series. The standard deviation of
prices within periods in Meg:Og-g is $0 (by construction). The standard
deviation of prices across all periods of Meg:Og-g is $2.32. In Poap by
contrast, the average of within-period standard deviation of prices is $1.85.
But the standard deviation of the average price across all periods of Poap
is only $0.80. Allowing variability in prices at a point in time may allow
for (naturally evolving) lower variability in prices across time. Our ndings
complement the ndings of Johnson and Plott (1989), who implemented in
the laboratory a POAP environment, but never used an institution with an
ex post market clearing price, or other uniform price institution. Johnson
and Plott did not nd price cycling of the kind which might be expected
under textbook-model uniform pricing, and conjectured that this might be
due to the posted oer and double auction institutions|which they did
use{suppressing price cycling. We can now claim more directly that this in-
deed seems to be the case: in the presence of advance production, replacing
the posted oer institution with an institution imposing an ex post market
clearing price can lead to cycling.
4.6. Comparative convergence properties of the market entry game and
posted oer with advance production
To quantify the impact of our treatments on convergence to equilibrium,
we regress an indicator for the achievement of competitive equilibrium entry
in each period (mt = m

t ), on a set of treatment and control variables, the
marginal eects of which are reported in Table VI. In addition to allowing
for a random eect at the group level, the specication includes a time
trend, binaries for treatment attributes and interactions between treatment
attributes and time, and a variable tracking whether or not the period in
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TABLE VI
Marginal Effects of Random Effects Probit on Competitive Equilibrium
Number of Entrants
Marginal Eect on the
Prob. of Competitive Equilibrium Entry,
Pr(m = m)
Marginal Eect Std. Error
Individual-level Shifter  0:0404 (0:0656)
Numerical Step Demand 0:0781 (0:0800)
Market (Poap)  0:0614 (0:0803)
Stationary c and h  0:0468 (0:0432)
Period 0:0012 (0:0009)
Period  Individual-level Shifter 0:0004 (0:0008)
Period  Numerical Step Demand  0:0011 (0:0009)
Period  Market (Poap) 0:0039 (0:0010)
Period  Stationary c and h 0:0028 (0:0008)
Observations 2,304
Random Eect St. Dev. 0.3038
Note: Random eect is at the group level, with 4 groups per each of the 6 treatments, and 96 periods
per group. Standard errors are in parentheses. Meg:Mf and Poap were coded as having Numerical
Step Demand. All treatments with \-i" designations had Individual-level Shifters.
 Signicant at the 1 percent level.
question is part of a stationary segment.24
We report a variety of tests, including both those for individual and for
joint signicance. Table VI reports the estimated marginal eects and (in-
dividual) signicance of each of the control and treatment variables. While
none of the intercept estimates on the treatment variables are signicant,
the coecients on the interaction between Period and Market (Poap), and
Period and Stationary c and h, are signicant at the 1% level. Joint tests,
24We report a probit with robust standard errors clustered on groups in Table X of
the appendix.
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with the null hypothesis being that both the intercept and slope coecients
for a single treatment are zero, are appropriate. We nd that the coecients
on Individual-level Shifter and Numerical Step Demand are not signicant
in joint tests (with p-values greater than 0.8035 and 0.4820, respectively),
and that the joint coecients on Market and Stationary c and h are signif-
icant at the 1% level (with a p-value less than 0.0001).25
The estimated coecients suggest that convergence to the competitive
pure strategy equilibrium is promoted by a stationary environment (as con-
jectured by Duy and Hopkins (2005)), and by individual posting of prices
rather than a single administered price. Any eect of system-wide versus
individual level variables (e.g. demand versus marginal costs) being used to
shift the parameterization across periods is ambiguous, and small. Verbal,
rather than algebraic presentation is signed so as to aid convergence, but
is not statistically signicant. The estimate of the time trend variable with-
out interactions (i.e. for the original market entry game), is positive, but
insignicant.
The estimated coecients can be used to calculate tted probabilities
of observing competitive equilibrium, and thus expected time of a particu-
lar likelihood of competitive equilibrium play under dierent combinations
of treatments and environments. For instance, in expectation, an average
group in treatmentPoap-i, featuring verbal description, individually posted
prices, and marginal cost as shifter, would if implemented in a stationary
environment reach 95% competitive equilibrium play at 120 periods under
the tted model.26 Individual posting of prices aids convergence, because by
25Tests for joint signicance are chi-squared tests over the likelihood ratios of the
reported unrestricted model and unreported (nested) restricted models. This involves
separate estimates (not reported, but available upon request) from those in Table VI.
This is also responsible for dierent p-values for the joint tests and for the tests on
individual coecients | each is calculated with respect to dierent estimates.
26Group-level heterogeneity permitted by the model also makes a dierence in time
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contrast, the original market entry game (Meg:Og-g) also implemented in
a stationary environment would have an expected time to 95% convergence
equal to 210 periods under the tted model.
Typical results for the market entry game can now be understood more
deeply. Under the tted model, an average group in the original market
entry game (Meg:Og-g) implemented in a nonstationary (varying c) envi-
ronment would be expected to reach 95% competitive equilibrium play on
the 648th period. When contrasted to 210 periods to 95% competitive equi-
librium play in a stationary environment, the tted model demonstrates the
importance of the stationary environment in equilibration. The tted model
also thus sheds light on the widespread failure to observe pure strategy play
in the original market entry game; 648 periods is far longer than most sin-
gle session human subjects experiments last.27 Binmore and Swierzbinski
(2007) have pointed out the possibility of cases | particular learning dy-
namics in particular games | where convergence cannot be observed within
the time spans feasible for human subjects experiments. The original mar-
ket entry game in a nonstationary environment appears to be such a case,
albeit a mild version. (Binmore and Swierzbinski include examples requiring
thousands of iterations for convergence).
The analysis reported in Table VI takes the group decision each period as
to convergence. For instance, for Poap-i, the impact of one standard deviation in the
random eect amounts to 17 periods to 95% convergence. Notably, the tted model
also predicts that the impact of group heterogeneity is greater, the greater the expected
number of periods to some level of convergence. (This, in addition to the stochastic
disturbance term, accommodates both later and earlier convergence than the average.)
27While the tted model predicts convergence for Meg:Og-g in a non-stationary
environment, it does so by means of estimated coecients|primarily the time trend
without interactions|which are not signicant. Thus, the possibility should be kept in
mind that Meg:Og-g, when implemented in a non-stationary environment, might not
ever converge.
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TABLE VII
OLS on Mean Squared Deviation (MSD) from Equilibrium Entrants by
Treatment
Treatment MSD from: Constant Std. Error P-value 1=Block Std. Error P-value R2
Meg:Og
Pure 0.0204 (0.0048) < 0:0001 0:0236 (0.0158) 0:0015 0.0242
Sym. Mixed 0.0332 (0.0023) < 0:0001  0:0197 (0.0045) < 0:0001 0.0736
Meg:Mf
Pure 0.0104 (0.0051) 0:0429 0:0402 (0.0102) 0:0001 0.0613
Sym. Mixed 0.0394 (0.0022) < 0:0001  0:0257 (0.0044) < 0:0001 0.1262
Poap
Pure 0.0016 (0.0050) 0:7413 0:0474 (0.0100) < 0:0001 0.0864
Sym. Mixed 0.0477 (0.002) < 0:0001  0:0264 (0.0039) < 0:0001 0.1590
the level of observation. While theory makes specic predictions about the
proportion of entrants for a given group in a given period, these predictions
are necessary, but not sucient, to say equilibration has been achieved. (For
instance, there are o-equilibrium strategies that could yield, in a single
period, the same proportion of entrants as the symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium.) For a deeper analysis, we must look at individual decision-
making that underlies the proportion of entry in groups.
To do so we employ, with our data, a modication of the approach to
individual level data used by Duy and Hopkins (2005). Table VII reports
the results of three OLS regressions (for each of the Meg:Og, Meg:Mf,
and Poap pairs of treatments, pooled) of mean squared deviation from
pure or symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium versus a time trend. In our
implementation, the time series is measured the reciprocal of multi-period
\Block" of the experiment.28
The dependent variable, (y^   y)2, is the mean squared deviation from the
prediction, with y being the proportion of entry in for subject i in the eight-
period constant segment of block t. The prediction, y^, is y^ = (c 1)=(n 1)
for the mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium. For the pure strategy equi-
librium, we follow Duy and Hopkins (2005) by assigning pure strategy
28The specication employed by Duy and Hopkins (2005) is linear in \Block". To aid
comparison, we report a model with \Block" as the independent variable, rather than
its reciprocal, in Table XIII of the appendix.
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predictions based on subjects' proportion of entry during the nal block
of the experiment.29 Thus, we assign y^ = 1 to the three subjects who en-
ter the most during the nal block and y^ = 0 to those who enter the
least.30 Thus, the unit of observation is individual proportion of decisions
aggregated across non-overlapping eight-period blocks.31 The independent
variable is 1=block, the reciprocal of number of blocks elapsed. The speci-
cation allows the estimated constant to be interpreted as the asymptotic
mean squared deviation.
We nd movement towards lower mean squared deviation from the pure
strategy equilibrium in all treatments (as illustrated by the positive and
signicant estimates on the 1=block coecients for the pure strategy regres-
sions), and movement away from the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
in all treatments (as illustrated by the negative and signicant estimates on
the 1=block coecients for the symmetric mixed strategy regressions). We
also nd no evidence contra the hypothesis that Poap converges asymptot-
ically to pure strategy equilibrium (as illustrated by the estimate of the con-
stant being not signicantly dierent from zero in this case). The model pre-
dicts that the two market entry game treatments, Meg:Og and Meg:Mf,
do not converge asymptotically to pure strategy equilibrium (as illustrated
by signicant estimates of the constant), although both slowly close toward
low levels of mean squared error from the pure strategy equilibrium.
29We identify ex post the players who are predicted ex ante to be the entrants in the
rst and subsequent periods in an attempt to track the adjustment process that leads to
the outcome observed at the end of the session.
30For most groups, assignment of pure strategy predictions is unambiguous. For one
group,Meg:Og-i (4), there is a tie between the number of times certain subjects entered
the most in the nal block. Assignment of subjects to the pure strategy equilibrium is
resolved by recursively examining prior blocks, until one is found for which the criteria
above are satised.
31We report a table of pure strategy y^ and mean squared deviations by block for every
subject in Table XI and Table XII of the appendix.
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Thus, we see that individual-level results support the inferences drawn
from our earlier consideration of the aggregate results. We also see that the
posted oer treatments (Poap-g and Poap-i) show greater evidence of con-
vergence toward competitive, pure-strategy equilibrium than do Meg:Og
and Meg:Mf.
5. CONCLUSION
In comparing two dierent games, the market entry game and the POAP,
we nd an intriguing and perhaps paradoxical result. For while the market
entry game has both fewer actions available to players and a smaller set of
pure strategy equilibria than does the POAP, the POAP converges much
more rapidly to the competitive equilibrium|obtainable under pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium in market entry game and POAP alike|than does
the market entry game.
Whether prices are set centrally and formulaically, or individually and
freely, makes a dramatic dierence to whether or not the competitive equi-
librium allocation is attained. Replacing posted oer pricing with a for-
mulaic, ex post market clearing price is associated with the emergence of
endogenous uctuations in prices/quantities. Insofar as such cycling may be
attributed to the use of a particular pricing approach in an advance pro-
duction environment, such cycling might also be described as self-inicted,
and avoidable.
The traditional characterization of behavior in the market entry game
as attaining equilibrium is also worth revisiting. The basis for such state-
ments has generally been a correspondence between the central tendency of
pooled data on entry decisions, m, and the number of entrants under the
competitive outcome. In typical market entry game data there is variation
around this central tendency, but in the absence of counterfactual cases, un-
der which unvarying equilibrium play is observed in similar environments,
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over similar time horizons, it would be tempting to dismiss discrepancies
as noise. However, in our experiments we have just such counterfactual
cases, employing similar environments and number of rounds, albeit im-
plementing a perturbation in pricing method. These counterfactual cases
show that equilibrium in empirical reality can look exactly as it is supposed
to theoretically|the exact m number of entrants, of unchanging identity,
unvaryingly, repeatedly playing in a manner consistent with pure strategy
equilibrium at the competitive outcome. Changing the pricing rule to allow
freely posted individual oers, holding environment the same, curtails uc-
tuation in prices and promotes attainment of the competitive equilibrium.
This pinpoints the key role of the uniform, ex post market clearing, price
implicit in the market entry game in shaping the data typical of the market
entry game.
Conversely, pooled data that center near the competitive outcome might
be produced by decidedly dis-equilibrium phenomena. For instance, in the
stationary segments (where c^ and m equal 3) of the market entry game
(Meg:Og-g) data, m has a mean of 2.75; the median of those data is 3.32
Is this evidence of equilibrium, or of something close enough thereto? A
rank-sum test leads us to reject the hypothesis that the central tendency is
3 (with p < 0:0003), but would not tell us whether the observed dispersion
around the median matters in terms of economics, not just statistics, or
why it might occur. However, when the data are plotted as (implicit) price
series in Figure 5, they show pronounced cycling in prices (and necessarily
also in quantities). No one would claim that these data exhibit converged
competitive equilibrium pricing.
32Note also that in subsection 4.2 and subsection 4.3, the interspersed non-stationary
segments of these same Meg:Og-g experiments produce just the kind of patterns typi-
cally found in market entry game studies | the kind of patterns that might conceivably
be held to be evidence of some correspondence with equilibrium.
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By rst identifying the presence of an implicit pricing rule in the market
entry game, then taking steps to relax that rule, in this present study we
have been able to generate new insight into the role of price-setting in the
equilibration of markets. Allowing individual posting of prices (rather than
an ex post, market clearing administered price) leads to widespread and
early convergence to the competitive equilibrium allocation, net of presen-
tational eects, and net of (non-)stationarity of demand or supply|even
when production decisions are irrevocable.
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APPENDIX A: EQUILIBRIUM IN THE POSTED OFFER WITH ADVANCE
PRODUCTION (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION)
Our implementation of the POAP has two stages: the rst, which for
ease of exposition we shall call the entry stage, and the second, the pricing
stage. We refer to the rst stage as the entry stage, rather than the advance
production stage, because each agent can only produce zero or one units, so
that like the entry stage in the market entry game the decision in the rst
stage of the POAP is binary. We do wish to emphasize this overlap between
the market entry game and the POAP, and we do not wish to unnecessarily
introduce new nomenclature.
During the rst stage, the entry stage, agents choose either to enter the
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market (IN) or stay out (OUT). As in the market entry game described in
section 1, agents choosing OUT receive a payo of v. Agents choosing IN
become entrants and proceed to the second stage of the game, the pricing
stage. In the pricing stage, entrants are informed of the number of entrants,
m, and then nominate an asking price for their units.
Below we characterize equilibrium strategies in the pricing stage. For
the parameters used in the experiment, we also demonstrate that (1) Nash
equilibrium play in the pricing stage can yield expected payos for price-
posting decisions that are equivalent to the payos attained by nominating
price as a function of number of entrants, via the demand curve and given
this, (2) subgame perfect play in the POAP yields payos in subgame perfect
equilibrium which are the same as in the pure strategy equilibria of the
market entry game.
A.1. Specication of Posted Oer with Advance Production
The demand curve faced by entrants can be expressed algebraically as
P (m) = r(c   m). The variable c, interpreted as capacity in the market
entry game, is here a parameter that determines the intercept of the demand
curve, i.e. rc.33 The demand curve is a step function with an interval between
prices of r and (as a consequence of value-order queuing) buyers purchase
at most x units at price P (x). As detailed in section 1, the variable h
is interpreted as the cost of advance production and we dene adjusted
capacity as c^  c  h=r.
If an entrant i sells at her asking price, Pi, her prot is (Pi) = v+Pi h.
If she fails to sell, her prot is (Pi) = v h. Whether or not entrant i sells
is determined by the implications of value-order queueing as applied to the
price that she nominates, Pi, and the prices other entrants nominate. An
33The demand curve may be written as P (m) = rc rm. Note that for m = 0 demand
is P (0) = rc and for m = 1, P (1) = r(c  1).
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entrant that prices \via the demand curve", nominating a price of Pi =
Pm  P (m) always sells and receives the payo i = v + r(c   m)   h,
equivalent to that of the market entry game.
A.1.1. Pricing Below Pm is a Dominated Strategy
Asking a price below Pm does not aect whether or not the entrant will
sell and can only lower the price at which the entrant does sell, which will
reduce the entrant's payo relative to pricing at Pm.
The demand curve has m units available for purchase at price Pm. Let
P k be any price strictly less than Pm. An entrant that nominates a price
P k always sells and receives i(P k) = v+P k h. Had the entrant priced
at Pm, the unit would have sold and earned i(Pm) = v + Pm   h, which is
greater than i(Pm k).
A.1.2. Pricing at Pm is an Equilibrium Strategy
Unilaterally asking at a price above Pm when all other entrants price at
Pm guarantees that the entrant will not sell, and can at best reduce the
entrant's payo relative to pricing at Pm.
Suppose that j = 1 entrant posts at Pk > Pm (with k > 1) and m   1
other entrants post at Pm. Then demand curve has at most m   k units
available for purchase at Pk. The m   1 asks at lower prices are lled rst
(if possible), meaning that there are at most j   1 = 0 units to be assigned
to the ask at Pk and the entrant will not sell. Provided that Pm > 0, the
entrant pricing at Pk would be better o pricing at Pm and selling (and if
Pm = 0, the entrant would be indierent).
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A.1.3. Pricing Above Pm is an Equilibrium Strategy Under Some
Conditions
While there is a competitive equilibrium in which entrants price via the
demand curve at Pi = Pm, there may also be \collusive pricing" equilibria
under which entrants price above Pm. Below we characterize the conditions
under which such equilibria occur.
The demand curve has at most m  k units available for purchase at any
price Pk > P (m), where k is the number of intervals (of r) by which that
Pk is strictly greater than Pm. In this nomenclature, Pk = Pm + rk.
Suppose that 1  j  m entrants each post the same asking price
Pk > Pm. Suppose also that m   j entrants have posted at prices below
Pk (possibly but not necessarily including Pm).
For the j entrants pricing at Pk, the demand curve has at most m   k
units available for purchase. The m   j asks at lower prices are lled rst
(if possible), meaning that there are at most j   k units to be assigned to
the j asks at Pk. Because ties are broken randomly, the probability that an
entrant sells is (j k)
j
and the probability that an entrant does not sell is k
j
.
The expected payo received by the j entrants pricing at Pk is E (i(Pk)) =
v+

j k
j

Pk h. Note that this payo is strictly increasing in j and neither
the number of entrants pricing below Pk nor the prices they post aect the
payo of entrants posting at Pk (nor vice versa). It follows that pricing in
equilibrium will be symmetric and uniform; we therefore impose j = m.34
Then, in expectation, the entrants' payos are higher posting at Pk (with
34A symmetry argument explains why asking prices cannot dier in equilibrium. If
there were dierent asking prices and an entrant were better o pricing at Pk, entrant(s)
pricing at a lower price would also be better o pricing at Pk (or vice versa). In the
case that an entrant asking Pk is indierent between this and asking some lower price,
an entrant asking a lower price that instead asks Pk will increase the expected payo of
pricing at Pk (since E (i(Pk)) is increasing in j).
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m   1 other entrants) than unilaterally deviating to a lower price Pk 1
(with guaranteed sale) if m k
m
Pk > Pk 1 (for Pk > Pk 1  Pm). The interval
between price Pk and Pk 1 is r, so these entrants are better o posting at
Pk than Pk 1 if Pk < rkm. (Since unilaterally pricing at Pk+1 guarantees an
entrant no sale, pricing at Pk 1 may be be an equilibrium for m entrants,
even when no entrant would unilaterally deviate to Pk 1 from Pk.) The
expected payo of posting at Pk is E (i(Pk)) = v +
m k
m
Pk   h.
Note that when Pk =
r
k
m, entrants pricing at Pk+1 are indierent between
pricing at Pk and Pk 1. Such an equality is not robust to trembles (Selten,
1975), since a tremble implies a non-zero probability of one or more of the
m entrants posting a lower asking price.
A.1.4. Predictions for the Poap Treatments via Subgame Perfection
In subgame perfect equilibrium, agents only enter (and proceed to the
pricing stage) if the expected payo of entering is at least as great than the
outside option, v. This is true when E(Pi)  h. For entrants pricing at Pm,
this is true when Pm > h; for m entrants pricing at Pk > Pm, this is true
when m k
m
Pk > h. (Agents are indierent between entering and staying out
at equality.)
A.2. Subgame Perfection in the Poap Treatments
Now let us consider the parameterization of the Poap-i treatment. (So-
lutions to the Poap-g treatment follow trivially.) In Poap-i, c=5 and
h = f2; 4; 6; 8g. As in all treatments, v = 1, r = 2, and there are n = 5
agents.
A.2.1. The Pricing Stage
Pricing along the demand curve is always supported in equilibrium. For
some number of entrants (i.e. m = f3; 4; 5g) other equilibria also exist.
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For m = 1 and m = 2, it is trivial to verify that in equilibrium entrants
will price along the demand curve at Pm = 8 and Pm = 6.
For m = 3, both all entrants pricing along the demand schedule at P1 = 4
and all entrants pricing at P1 = 6 are equilibria. However, all entrants
pricing at P1 = 6 is not robust to trembles.
For m = 4, all entrants posting at Pm = 2 and all entrants posting at
P1 = 4 are each equilibrium strategy proles in the pricing stage.
For m = 5, all entrants posting at Pm = 0, all entrants posting at P1 = 2,
and all entrants posting at P2 = 4 are each equilibrium strategy proles in
the pricing stage.
A.2.2. The Entry Stage and Subgame Perfection
Pricing along the demand curve in the pricing stage results in a subgame
perfect equilibrium with payo equivalence with the market entry game for
any h. For h = f2; 4g other equilibria also exist.
If h = 8, then entry is protable, i.e. E(Pi)  h only when P (m) = 8,
which occurs when m = 1. The entrant is indierent between entering and
staying out.
If h = 6, then entry is protable only when P (m)  6, which occurs when
m  2. When m = 1, the second entrant is indierent between entering and
staying out.
If h = 4, then entry is protable only when P (m)  4 or m k
m
Pk  4.
Both occur when m  3. Regardless of whether all entrants price at Pm = 4
or P1 = 6, the third entrant is indierent between entering and staying out.
If h = 2, then entry is protable only when P (m)  2 or m k
m
Pk  2.
There is an equilibrium whem m  4 and all entrants price at Pm = 2,
with the fourth entrant being indierent between entering and staying out.
There is also an equilibrium when m  5; for both four and ve entrants,
posting at Pk = 4 is an equilibrium in the pricing stage, so the fth entrant
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in this case has a strictly positive incentive to enter.
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TABLE VIII
Summary of Parameters by Treatment for the First Block
Panel A. Demand Schedule A: c = 5
Unit Number 0 1 2 3 4 5
Resale Value 10 8 6 4 2 0
Panel B. Demand Schedule B: c = 6
Unit Number 0 1 2 3 4 5
Resale Value 12 10 8 6 4 2
Panel C. Demand Schedule C: c = 7
Unit Number 0 1 2 3 4 5
Resale Value 14 12 10 8 6 4
Panel D. Demand Schedule D: c = 8
Unit Number 0 1 2 3 4 5
Resale Value 16 14 12 10 8 6
Panel E. Summary of Parameters for First Block, Periods 1 through 16
Varying Constant Varying
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
m 1 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 4 3 2
Meg:Og-g
c 1 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 4 3 2
h 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Meg:Og-i
c 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
h 8 6 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 2 4 6
Meg:Mf-g
Demand A B D C C C C C C C C C A D C B
h 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Meg:Mf-i
Demand A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
h 8 6 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 2 4 6
Poap-g
Demand A B D C C C C C C C C C A D C B
h 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Poap-i
Demand A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
h 8 6 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 2 4 6
Note: Demand is given by P (m) = r(c  m) where r = 2 throughout; varying c produces demand
schedules A, B, C, and D. The predicted number of entrants is m = c^ where c^ = c  h=r.
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TABLE IX
McNemar's Paired Tests on Contingency Tables of Transitions in First
and Last Pairs of Sub-Blocks for c = f1; 2; 3; 4g in Meg:Og-g
Panel A. Contingency Table of Transitions and McNemar's Test for c = 1
2 = 5:1429, p  0:0233 Sub-Blocks 11 and 12
Transition No Transition
Sub-Blocks 1 and 2
Transition 1 7
No Transition 0 12
Panel B. Contingency Table of Transitions and McNemar's Test for c = 2
2 = 0:9000, p  0:3428 Sub-Blocks 11 and 12
Transition No Transition
Sub-Blocks 1 and 2
Transition 0 7
No Transition 3 10
Panel C. Contingency Table of Transitions and McNemar's Test for c = 3
2 = 2:3442, p  0:1258 Sub-Blocks 11 and 12
Transition No Transition
Sub-Blocks 1 and 2
Transition 2 7
No Transition 2 9
Panel D. Contingency Table of Transitions and McNemar's Test for c = 4
2 = 1:7778, p  0:1824 Sub-Blocks 11 and 12
Transition No Transition
Sub-Blocks 1 and 2
Transition 0 6
No Transition 2 12
Note: Each panel, A through D, reports the contingent frequencies of 20 subjects transitioning or
not in the rst and last pair of sub-blocks, for c = f1; 2; 3; 4g respectively. For each, the results of a
McNemar test are reported, with the null hypothesis being equality of the marginal probabilities of
each outcome.
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TABLE X
Marginal Effects of Probit on Competitive Equilibrium Number of
Entrants with Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Groups
Prob. of Competitive Equilibrium Entry,
Pr(m = m)
Individual-level Shifter  0:0391
(0:0574)
Numerical Step Demand 0:0764
(0:0709)
Market (Poap)  0:0576
(0:0737)
Stationary c and h  0:0457
(0:0544)
Period 0:0012
(0:0010)
Period  Individual-level Shifter 0:0005
(0:0011)
Period  Numerical Step Demand  0:0010
(0:0013)
Period  Market (Poap) 0:0036
(0:0015)
Period  Stationary c and h 0:0027
(0:0009)
Observations 2,304
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level, with 4 groups per each of the 6
treatments, and 96 periods per group. Standard errors are in parentheses. Meg:Mf and Poap were
coded as having Numerical Step Demand. Treatments with \-i" designations had Individual-level
Shifters.
 Signicant at the 1 percent level.
 Signicant at the 5 percent level.
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TABLE XI
Mean Squared Deviation from Pure and Symmetric Mixed Strategy
Equilibria Entry Across Treatments with Group-Level Shifters
T
re
a
t.
G
ro
u
p
S
u
b
je
c
t
P
.S
.
y^
Pure Strategy (y^   y)2, in Block Symm. Mixed Strategy (y^   y)2 in Block
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Meg:Og-g 1 1 0 .050 .153 .200 .028 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .003 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 1 2 1 .028 .050 .112 .112 .028 .003 .003 .000 .012 .012 .003 .028
Meg:Og-g 1 3 1 .050 .012 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .028 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 1 4 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 1 5 1 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 2 1 1 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 2 2 0 .028 .003 .000 .000 .003 .003 .003 .028 .050 .050 .028 .028
Meg:Og-g 2 3 0 .003 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .028 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 2 4 1 .028 .012 .012 .012 .078 .112 .003 .012 .012 .012 .003 .012
Meg:Og-g 2 5 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 3 1 1 .003 .050 .012 .028 .050 .012 .028 .000 .012 .003 .000 .012
Meg:Og-g 3 2 1 .012 .028 .000 .003 .028 .003 .012 .003 .050 .028 .003 .028
Meg:Og-g 3 3 1 .050 .078 .050 .003 .050 .028 .000 .003 .000 .028 .000 .003
Meg:Og-g 3 4 0 .078 .028 .078 .112 .050 .050 .003 .003 .003 .012 .000 .000
Meg:Og-g 3 5 0 .012 .003 .078 .012 .000 .000 .012 .028 .003 .012 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 4 1 0 .003 .028 .003 .078 .112 .000 .028 .003 .028 .003 .012 .050
Meg:Og-g 4 2 1 .050 .028 .078 .078 .050 .078 .000 .003 .003 .003 .000 .003
Meg:Og-g 4 3 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 4 4 0 .003 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .012 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-g 4 5 1 .012 .003 .050 .000 .000 .000 .012 .028 .000 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 1 1 0 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 1 2 1 .003 .012 .003 .003 .012 .028 .028 .012 .028 .028 .012 .003
Meg:Mf-g 1 3 1 .153 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 1 4 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 1 5 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 2 1 1 .153 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 2 2 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 2 3 0 .078 .200 .012 .200 .200 .003 .003 .050 .012 .050 .050 .028
Meg:Mf-g 2 4 0 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 2 5 1 .000 .153 .000 .200 .200 .003 .050 .028 .050 .050 .050 .028
Meg:Mf-g 3 1 1 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 3 2 0 .050 .050 .028 .050 .003 .028 .000 .000 .003 .000 .028 .003
Meg:Mf-g 3 3 1 .028 .012 .012 .003 .012 .012 .003 .012 .012 .028 .012 .012
Meg:Mf-g 3 4 1 .050 .050 .028 .028 .012 .012 .000 .000 .003 .003 .012 .012
Meg:Mf-g 3 5 0 .012 .003 .000 .000 .003 .000 .012 .028 .050 .050 .028 .050
Meg:Mf-g 4 1 1 .050 .078 .078 .050 .078 .012 .000 .003 .003 .000 .003 .012
Meg:Mf-g 4 2 0 .078 .050 .050 .050 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 4 3 1 .028 .003 .000 .003 .003 .000 .003 .028 .050 .028 .028 .050
Meg:Mf-g 4 4 1 .028 .003 .000 .003 .000 .000 .003 .028 .050 .028 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-g 4 5 0 .078 .003 .012 .000 .003 .012 .003 .028 .012 .050 .028 .012
Poap-g 1 1 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 1 2 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 1 3 0 .200 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 1 4 1 .078 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 1 5 1 .003 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 2 1 0 .050 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 2 2 1 .003 .003 .003 .000 .003 .000 .028 .028 .028 .050 .028 .050
Poap-g 2 3 1 .078 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 2 4 1 .028 .012 .050 .078 .050 .003 .003 .012 .000 .003 .000 .028
Poap-g 2 5 0 .153 .012 .012 .028 .028 .028 .028 .012 .012 .003 .003 .003
Poap-g 3 1 0 .153 .200 .200 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 3 2 1 .028 .078 .050 .000 .000 .000 .003 .003 .000 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 3 3 0 .028 .050 .003 .003 .003 .000 .003 .000 .028 .028 .028 .050
Poap-g 3 4 1 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 3 5 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 4 1 0 .200 .153 .112 .012 .028 .000 .050 .028 .012 .012 .003 .050
Poap-g 4 2 1 .112 .003 .028 .000 .000 .000 .012 .028 .003 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 4 3 1 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-g 4 4 1 .012 .050 .003 .012 .000 .000 .012 .000 .028 .012 .050 .050
Poap-g 4 5 0 .012 .000 .000 .028 .000 .000 .012 .050 .050 .003 .050 .050
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TABLE XII
Mean Squared Deviation from Pure and Symmetric Mixed Strategy
Equilibria Entry Across Treatments with Individual-Level Shifters
T
re
a
t.
G
ro
u
p
S
u
b
je
c
t
P
.S
.
y^
Pure Strategy (y^   y)2, in Block Symm. Mixed Strategy (y^   y)2 in Block
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Meg:Og-i 1 1 1 .028 .003 .000 .028 .000 .000 .003 .028 .050 .003 .050 .050
Meg:Og-i 1 2 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-i 1 3 0 .050 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-i 1 4 1 .050 .012 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .012 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-i 1 5 1 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Og-i 2 1 0 .028 .012 .028 .012 .012 .012 .003 .012 .003 .012 .012 .012
Meg:Og-i 2 2 0 .112 .112 .078 .078 .078 .012 .012 .012 .003 .003 .003 .012
Meg:Og-i 2 3 1 .078 .153 .078 .050 .078 .028 .003 .028 .003 .000 .003 .003
Meg:Og-i 2 4 1 .050 .003 .050 .028 .012 .012 .000 .028 .000 .003 .012 .012
Meg:Og-i 2 5 1 .012 .003 .003 .012 .000 .000 .012 .028 .028 .012 .050 .050
Meg:Og-i 3 1 0 .078 .078 .012 .078 .000 .000 .003 .003 .012 .003 .050 .050
Meg:Og-i 3 2 1 .112 .050 .153 .003 .012 .000 .012 .000 .028 .028 .012 .050
Meg:Og-i 3 3 1 .028 .003 .000 .012 .028 .003 .003 .028 .050 .012 .003 .028
Meg:Og-i 3 4 1 .200 .200 .200 .200 .003 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .028 .050
Meg:Og-i 3 5 0 .112 .078 .078 .050 .050 .000 .012 .003 .003 .000 .000 .050
Meg:Og-i 4 1 0 .078 .050 .050 .050 .003 .028 .003 .000 .000 .000 .028 .003
Meg:Og-i 4 2 0 .050 .003 .012 .028 .078 .153 .000 .028 .012 .003 .003 .028
Meg:Og-i 4 3 1 .028 .050 .028 .012 .028 .028 .003 .000 .003 .012 .003 .003
Meg:Og-i 4 4 1 .050 .153 .078 .050 .012 .028 .000 .028 .003 .000 .012 .003
Meg:Og-i 4 5 1 .003 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-i 1 1 0 .200 .200 .050 .078 .078 .000 .050 .050 .000 .003 .003 .050
Meg:Mf-i 1 2 1 .153 .028 .000 .003 .028 .000 .028 .003 .050 .028 .003 .050
Meg:Mf-i 1 3 1 .012 .012 .050 .078 .078 .000 .012 .012 .000 .003 .003 .050
Meg:Mf-i 1 4 0 .050 .028 .153 .000 .050 .000 .000 .003 .028 .050 .000 .050
Meg:Mf-i 1 5 1 .012 .028 .050 .003 .012 .000 .012 .003 .000 .028 .012 .050
Meg:Mf-i 2 1 1 .050 .112 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-i 2 2 0 .112 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .012 .050 .028 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-i 2 3 0 .078 .200 .050 .003 .003 .000 .003 .050 .000 .028 .028 .050
Meg:Mf-i 2 4 1 .078 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-i 2 5 1 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-i 3 1 1 .050 .012 .012 .012 .003 .000 .000 .012 .012 .012 .028 .050
Meg:Mf-i 3 2 1 .003 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .028 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-i 3 3 1 .003 .028 .050 .012 .050 .000 .028 .003 .000 .012 .000 .050
Meg:Mf-i 3 4 0 .050 .078 .050 .012 .028 .000 .000 .003 .000 .012 .003 .050
Meg:Mf-i 3 5 0 .028 .012 .003 .003 .003 .000 .003 .012 .028 .028 .028 .050
Meg:Mf-i 4 1 0 .028 .112 .200 .003 .028 .028 .003 .012 .050 .028 .003 .003
Meg:Mf-i 4 2 1 .028 .028 .000 .028 .000 .000 .003 .003 .050 .003 .050 .050
Meg:Mf-i 4 3 1 .012 .012 .003 .012 .000 .003 .012 .012 .028 .012 .050 .028
Meg:Mf-i 4 4 1 .028 .003 .078 .078 .028 .050 .003 .028 .003 .003 .003 .000
Meg:Mf-i 4 5 0 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 1 1 0 .112 .012 .028 .000 .000 .000 .012 .012 .003 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 1 2 1 .012 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 1 3 0 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 1 4 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .028
Poap-i 1 5 1 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 2 1 0 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050 .028
Poap-i 2 2 0 .050 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 2 3 1 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 2 4 1 .003 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .028 .050 .050 .028 .050 .050
Poap-i 2 5 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 3 1 1 .078 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .028 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 3 2 1 .050 .028 .153 .200 .000 .000 .000 .003 .028 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 3 3 0 .050 .003 .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .028 .050 .003 .050 .050
Poap-i 3 4 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 3 5 0 .028 .050 .153 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .028 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 4 1 0 .200 .028 .112 .078 .200 .003 .050 .003 .012 .003 .050 .028
Poap-i 4 2 1 .000 .050 .012 .050 .112 .028 .050 .000 .012 .000 .012 .003
Poap-i 4 3 1 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 4 4 0 .003 .078 .000 .000 .000 .000 .028 .003 .050 .050 .050 .050
Poap-i 4 5 1 .050 .200 .153 .028 .000 .000 .000 .050 .028 .003 .050 .050
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Figure 6: Implied Prices and Quantities Exchanged in Stationary Periods
of All Sessions of Treatment Meg:Og-i.
Note: Sessions with asterisks () are explained in footnote 8.
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Figure 7: Implied Prices and Quantities Exchanged in Stationary Periods
of All Sessions of Treatment Meg:Mf-g.
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Figure 8: Implied Prices and Quantities Exchanged in Stationary Periods
of All Sessions of Treatment Meg:Mf-i.
workingpaper.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: paper.tex date: September 19, 2017
53
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
TABLE XIII
OLS on Mean Squared Deviation (MSD) from Equilibrium Entrants by
Treatment
Treatment MSD from: Constant Std. Error P-value Block Std. Error P-value R2
Meg:Og
Pure 0.0482 (0.0063) < 0:001  0:0052 (0.0016) 0:0015 0.0417
Sym. Mixed 0.0138 (0.0030) < 0:001 0:0033 (0.0008) < 0:001 0.0717
Meg:Mf
Pure 0.0525 (0.0066) < 0:001  0:0074 (0.0017) < 0:001 0.0732
Sym. Mixed 0.0142 (0.0029) < 0:001 0:0042 (0.0007) < 0:001 0.1186
Poap
Pure 0.0495 (0.0065) < 0:001  0:0082 (0.0017) < 0:001 0.0911
Sym. Mixed 0.0218 (0.0026) < 0:001 0:0043 (0.0007) < 0:001 0.1519
APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION)
B.1. Instructions for Treatment Meg:Og-g
B.1.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 participants. In each round, you will have the opportunity to
make a decision between one of two possible actions. Once all participants
have made their decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to
you your payo resulting from that round's events, and also the determi-
nants of that payo | namely your decision, and the decisions of others
also participating. (More on this below.) There will be multiple rounds.
Throughout these rounds you will stay in the same group of 5 participants.
B.1.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse. If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
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informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.1.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo depends on the total number of partici-
pants, including yourself, who choose action IN. Suppose that m = 1,
2, 3, 4, or 5 represents the number of participants who choose IN. If
you are one of these m participants, your payo for the round is given
by:
Payo = 1 + 2  (c m)  hi
where
c = \capacity" of the market (may vary by round)
m = determined as the total number of participants choosing IN in a
given round
hi = your individual cost of choosing IN (may vary by round)
For example, if you are one of 3 participants who chooses IN, and c = 4
and hi = 0, then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  3)  0,
which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except c, which was instead c = 2. Then your payo from
choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (2  3)  0, which equals  1.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except m, which was instead m = 2. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  2)  0, which equals 5.
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Are there any questions before we begin?
B.2. Instructions for Treatment Meg:Og-i
B.2.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 participants. In each round, you will have the opportunity to
make a decision between one of two possible actions. Once all participants
have made their decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to
you your payo resulting from that round's events, and also the determi-
nants of that payo | namely your decision, and the decisions of others
also participating. (More on this below.) There will be multiple rounds.
Throughout these rounds you will stay in the same group of 5 participants.
B.2.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse. If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.2.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
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• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo depends on the total number of partici-
pants, including yourself, who choose action IN. Suppose that m = 1,
2, 3, 4, or 5 represents the number of participants who choose IN. If
you are one of these m participants, your payo for the round is given
by:
Payo = 1 + 2  (c m)  hi
where
c = \capacity" of the market (may vary by round)
m = determined as the total number of participants choosing IN in a
given round
hi = your individual cost of choosing IN (may vary by round)
For example, if you are one of 3 participants who chooses IN, and c = 4
and hi = 0, then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  3)  0,
which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except hi, which was instead hi = 4. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  3)  4, which equals  1.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except m, which was instead m = 2. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  2)  0, which equals 5.
Are there any questions before we begin?
B.3. Instructions for Treatment Meg:Og-i
B.3.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 participants. In each round, you will have the opportunity to
workingpaper.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: paper.tex date: September 19, 2017
57
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
make a decision between one of two possible actions. Once all participants
have made their decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to
you your payo resulting from that round's events, and also the determi-
nants of that payo | namely your decision, and the decisions of others
also participating. (More on this below.) There will be multiple rounds.
Throughout these rounds you will stay in the same group of 5 participants.
B.3.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse. If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.3.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo depends on the total number of partici-
pants, including yourself, who choose action IN. Suppose that m = 1,
2, 3, 4, or 5 represents the number of participants who choose IN. If
you are one of these m participants, your payo for the round is given
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by:
Payo = 1 + 2  (c m)  hi
where
c = \capacity" of the market (may vary by round)
m = determined as the total number of participants choosing IN in a
given round
hi = your individual cost of choosing IN (may vary by round)
(Note also that at the beginning of each round, you will be informed of
the number of units at which the payo to \IN" and the payo to \OUT"
intersect in that round.)
For example, if you are one of 3 participants who chooses IN, and c = 4
and hi = 0, then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  3)  0,
which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except hi, which was instead hi = 4. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  3)  4, which equals  1.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except m, which was instead m = 2. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 2  (4  2)  0, which equals 5.
Are there any questions before we begin?
B.4. Instructions for Treatment Meg:Mf-g
B.4.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 participants. In each round, you will have the opportunity to
make a decision between one of two possible actions. Once all participants
have made their decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to
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you your payo resulting from that round's events, and also the determi-
nants of that payo | namely your decision, and the decisions of others
also participating. (More on this below.) There will be multiple rounds.
Throughout these rounds you will stay in the same group of 5 participants.
B.4.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse. If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.4.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo will be equal to 1 + Price  MCi. The
components of this payo are given by the following:
{ Price will be determined by the computer (a) adding up the num-
ber of people choosing IN (and who are thus attempting to sell 1
unit of a good) and (b) calculating the price which will allow all
units to be sold at a single price. In a given round, the computer
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does this (b) by referencing a given one of the following four de-
mand schedules (which demand schedule is in eect in a given
round is disclosed to you at the start of that round):
Demand Schedule A
Unit Resale Value
First 8
Second 6
Third 4
Fourth 2
Fifth 0
Demand Schedule B
Unit Resale Value
First 10
Second 8
Third 6
Fourth 4
Fifth 2
Demand Schedule C
Unit Resale Value
First 12
Second 10
Third 8
Fourth 6
Fifth 4
Demand Schedule D
Unit Resale Value
First 14
Second 12
Third 10
Fourth 8
Fifth 6
If one person chooses IN, then 1 unit is sold at the rst unit
price; if two people choose IN, then 2 units are sold at the sec-
ond unit price, and so on. (Note also that at the beginning of
each round, you will be informed of the number of units at which
the demand schedule and the supply schedule intersect in that
round.)
{ You have an individual marginal cost of supplying a unit, MCi.
For example, if you are one of 3 people who chooses IN, and MCi = 8 and
demand schedule D is in eect, then your payo from choosing IN would
be: 1 + 10  8, which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
workingpaper.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: paper.tex date: September 19, 2017
61
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
stayed the same, except demand schedule B was in eect. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 6  8, which equals  1.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except the number of people choosing IN, which was in-
stead 2. Then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 12   8, which
equals 5.
Are there any questions before we begin?
B.5. Instructions for Treatment Meg:Mf-i
B.5.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 participants. In each round, you will have the opportunity to
make a decision between one of two possible actions. Once all participants
have made their decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to
you your payo resulting from that round's events, and also the determi-
nants of that payo | namely your decision, and the decisions of others
also participating. (More on this below.) There will be multiple rounds.
Throughout these rounds you will stay in the same group of 5 participants.
B.5.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse. If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
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informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.5.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo will be equal to 1 + Price  MCi. The
components of this payo are given by the following:
{ Price will be determined by the computer (a) adding up the num-
ber of people choosing IN (and who are thus attempting to sell
1 unit of a good) and (b) calculating the price which will allow
all units to be sold at a single price. In a given round, the com-
puter does this (b) by referencing the following demand schedule:
Unit Resale Value
First 8
Second 6
Third 4
Fourth 2
Fifth 0
If one person chooses IN, then 1 unit is sold at a price equal
to 8; if two people choose IN, then 2 units are sold at a price of
6, and so on. (Note also that at the beginning of each round, you
will be informed of the number of units at which the demand
schedule and the supply schedule intersect in that round.)
{ You have an individual marginal cost of supplying a unit, MCi
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(may vary by round).
For example, if you are one of 3 people who chooses IN, and MCi = 2,
then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 4  2, which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except MCi, which was instead MCi = 6. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 4  6, which equals  1.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except the number of people choosing IN, which was in-
stead 2. Then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1+6 2, which equals
5.
Are there any questions before we begin?
B.6. Instructions for Treatment Poap-g
B.6.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 human participants acting as sellers and 5 robots acting as
buyers. In each round, you will have the opportunity to make a decision
between one of two possible actions. Once all participants have made their
decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to you your payo
resulting from that round's events, and also the determinants of that payo
- namely your decision, and the decisions of others also participating. (More
on this below.) There will be multiple rounds. Throughout these rounds you
will stay in the same group of 5 human participants as sellers (with 5 robots
as buyers).
B.6.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
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the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse; If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.6.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo will be equal to 1 + Price  MCi. The
components of this payo are given by the following:
{ Price will be determined by (a) what you nominate as a price
(which must be an even number) and (b) whether a robot buyer
chooses to purchase from you at the price you nominate. There
are 5 robot buyers, each of whom can re-sell a purchased unit to
the experimenter. The amount for which each robot buyer can
re-sell a purchased unit to the experimenter is given by the de-
mand schedule in eect in that round. In a given round, one of
the following four demand schedules will be in eect (which de-
mand schedule is in eect in a given round is disclosed to you at
the start of the round):
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Demand Schedule A
Unit Resale Value
First 8
Second 6
Third 4
Fourth 2
Fifth 0
Demand Schedule B
Unit Resale Value
First 10
Second 8
Third 6
Fourth 4
Fifth 2
Demand Schedule C
Unit Resale Value
First 12
Second 10
Third 8
Fourth 6
Fifth 4
Demand Schedule D
Unit Resale Value
First 14
Second 12
Third 10
Fourth 8
Fifth 6
(Note also that at the beginning of each round, you will be in-
formed of the number of units at which the demand schedule and
the supply schedule intersect in that round.)
{ The robot buyers are programmed to choose (among units listed
for sale) in descending order of resale value | that is, the robot
buyer with the highest resale value chooses rst, the buyer with
the second highest resale value chooses second, and so on. A
robot buyer chooses the lowest priced unit available, provided
that resale value is greater than or equal to the price (otherwise
it will not purchase at all).
{ If no robot buyer purchases from you (in a round in which you
have chosen IN), then the price will equal the \scrap price" for
your purposes of determining your payo in that round. The
scrap price will always equal the lowest resale value on the de-
mand schedule.
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{ If multiple units are listed at a given price, then the robot buyers
may purchase all, none, or one or some but not all units. In
the last case (in which only one or some but not all units are
purchased) a random tie-breaker is employed to determine which
of the units are purchased or not.
{ You have an individual marginal cost of supplying a unit, MCi.
For example, if demand schedule D is in eect, and you choose IN, and
MCi = 8, and you nominate a price of 10, and a buyer purchases your unit,
then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 10  8, which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except no robot buyer bought your unit. Because you
couldnt sell to a robot buyer, you would receive the scrap price, 6. Then
your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 6  8, which equals  1.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except the price you nominated was 12. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 12  8, which equals 5.
Are there any questions before we begin?
B.7. Instructions for Treatment Poap-g
B.7.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 human participants acting as sellers and 5 robots acting as
buyers. In each round, you will have the opportunity to make a decision
between one of two possible actions. Once all participants have made their
decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to you your payo
resulting from that round's events, and also the determinants of that payo
- namely your decision, and the decisions of others also participating. (More
on this below.) There will be multiple rounds. Throughout these rounds you
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will stay in the same group of 5 human participants as sellers (with 5 robots
as buyers).
B.7.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse; If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.7.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo will be equal to 1 + Price  MCi. The
components of this payo are given by the following:
{ Price will be determined by (a) what you nominate as a price
(which must be an even number) and (b) whether a robot buyer
chooses to purchase from you at the price you nominate. There
are 5 robot buyers, each of whom can re-sell a purchased unit to
the experimenter. The amount for which each robot buyer can
re-sell a purchased unit to the experimenter is given by the de-
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mand schedule in eect in that round. In a given round, one of
the following four demand schedules will be in eect (which de-
mand schedule is in eect in a given round is disclosed to you at
the start of the round):
Demand Schedule A
Unit Resale Value
First 8
Second 6
Third 4
Fourth 2
Fifth 0
Demand Schedule B
Unit Resale Value
First 10
Second 8
Third 6
Fourth 4
Fifth 2
Demand Schedule C
Unit Resale Value
First 12
Second 10
Third 8
Fourth 6
Fifth 4
Demand Schedule D
Unit Resale Value
First 14
Second 12
Third 10
Fourth 8
Fifth 6
(Note also that at the beginning of each round, you will be in-
formed of the number of units at which the demand schedule and
the supply schedule intersect in that round.)
{ The robot buyers are programmed to choose (among units listed
for sale) in descending order of resale value | that is, the robot
buyer with the highest resale value chooses rst, the buyer with
the second highest resale value chooses second, and so on. A
robot buyer chooses the lowest priced unit available, provided
that resale value is greater than or equal to the price (otherwise
it will not purchase at all).
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{ If no robot buyer purchases from you (in a round in which you
have chosen IN), price will equal 0 for purposes of determining
your payo in that round.
{ If multiple units are listed at a given price, then the robot buyers
may purchase all, none, or one or some but not all units. In
the last case (in which only one or some but not all units are
purchased) a random tie-breaker is employed to determine which
of the units are purchased or not.
{ You have an individual marginal cost of supplying a unit, MCi.
For example, if demand schedule D is in eect, and you choose IN, and
MCi = 8, and you nominate a price of 10, and a buyer purchases your unit,
then your payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 10  8, which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except demand schedule A was in eect. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 0  8, which equals -7.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except the price you nominated was 12. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 12  8, which equals 5.
Are there any questions before we begin?
B.8. Instructions for Treatment Poap-i
B.8.1. This Segment
In the rounds about to begin, and which will continue until further notice,
there are 5 human participants acting as sellers and 5 robots acting as
buyers. In each round, you will have the opportunity to make a decision
between one of two possible actions. Once all participants have made their
decisions, a second screen will appear which will report to you your payo
resulting from that round's events, and also the determinants of that payo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- namely your decision, and the decisions of others also participating. (More
on this below.) There will be multiple rounds. Throughout these rounds you
will stay in the same group of 5 human participants as sellers (with 5 robots
as buyers).
B.8.2. The Sequence of Play in a Round
The rst computer screen you see in each round asks you to make a
decision between two actions: IN or OUT. You enter your decision by using
the mouse to ll in the radio-button next to the action you wish to take. If
you want to choose action IN, ll in the circle next to IN by clicking on it
with the mouse; If you want to choose action OUT, ll in the circle next to
OUT by clicking on it with the mouse. Once all participants have entered
their decisions, a second screen will appear. This second screen reminds you
of your decision for the round, informs you of your payo for the round, and
informs you of other determinants of your payo (e.g. the decisions taken by
other participants). Your payo represents an amount in ECU that could
be paid to you in cash (if the given round is randomly selected for payo)
as will be explained below.
B.8.3. How payos are Determined
Payos are determined as follows:
• If you choose OUT your payo for the round is equal to 1 (this is true
in each round).
• If you choose IN, your payo will be equal to 1 + Price  MCi. The
components of this payo are given by the following:
{ Price will be determined by (a) what you nominate as a price
(which must be an even number) and (b) whether a robot buyer
chooses to purchase from you at the price you nominate. There
are 5 robot buyers, each of whom can re-sell a purchased unit to
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the experimenter, such that:
One buyer has a resale value of 8.
One buyer has a resale value of 6.
One buyer has a resale value of 4.
One buyer has a resale value of 2.
One buyer has a resale value of 0.
(Note also that at the beginning of each round, you will be in-
formed of the number of units at which the demand schedule and
the supply schedule intersect in that round.)
{ The robot buyers are programmed to choose (among units listed
for sale) in descending order of resale value | that is, the robot
buyer with the highest resale value chooses rst, the buyer with
the second highest resale value chooses second, and so on. A
robot buyer chooses the lowest priced unit available, provided
that resale value is greater than or equal to the price (otherwise
it will not purchase at all).
{ If no robot buyer purchases from you (in a round in which you
have chosen IN), price will equal 0 for purposes of determining
your payo in that round.
{ If multiple units are listed at a given price, then the robot buyers
may purchase all, none, or one or some but not all units. In
the last case (in which only one or some but not all units are
purchased) a random tie-breaker is employed to determine which
of the units are purchased or not.
{ You have an individual marginal cost of supplying a unit, MCi
(which may vary by round).
For example, if you choose IN, and MCi = 2, and you nominate a price
equal to 4, and a buyer purchases your unit, then your payo from choosing
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IN would be: 1 + 4  2, which equals 3.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except MCi which was instead equal to 6. Then your
payo from choosing IN would be: 1 + 4  6, which equals  1.
As another example, suppose all of the numbers in the rst example
stayed the same, except the price you nominated was 6. Then your payo
from choosing IN would be: 1 + 6  2, which equals 5.
Are there any questions before we begin?
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